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Illiquidity is at the core of the various currency and banking/financial crises of the 1990s. 
In the wake of the Asian crisis of 1997/98 the term “systemic liquidity” has been coined 
to refer to adequate arrangements and practices which permit efficient liquidity 
management and which provide a buffer during financial distress. A constructed balance-
sheet-based variable that captures the essence of the risk from systemic liquidity is 
funding volatility ratio, FVR. Using data covering January 1990 to July 2003 and 
employing cointegration techniques, this study attempts to quantify the purported link 
between FVR and the measurable determinants of a balanced liquidity infrastructure for 
Indonesia, the country that suffered the most from the Asian crisis. A good fit is obtained 
for the dynamic regression model and estimates of short-run and long-run impacts and 
elasticities are computed. FVR is shown to be increasing in the rupiah-US dollar 
exchange rate, the Jakarta stock market index, interest rate and the number of banks, and 
decreasing in capital:asset ratio and foreign liabilities: total asset ratio. The best option for 
lowering the FVR in the short run is increasing bank capital; over the long term enduring 
increases in foreign-currency accounts and reduction in the number of banks seem to hold 
the best prospect for lowering the FVR. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The theory of banking is well established and widely known. Banks exist to intermediate 
between cash-surplus economic agents and cash-deficit agents with profitable investment 
opportunities. To achieve the multi-faceted objective of optimizing profitability, liquidity 
and solvency, banks manage their assets, liabilities, liquidity and capital adequacy by 
minimising the risk they face from loan default (credit risk), deposit withdrawals 
(liquidity risk) and interest rate movements that can reduce their earnings and returns 
(interest-rate risk). Where foreign-currency transactions are significant there might be the 
additional risk from adverse exchange rate movements to contend with. Excessive risk 
taking or ineffectual risk management by banks, ineffective supervision by regulatory 
agencies and matters that undermine depositors’ and creditors’ confidence are at the core 
of all bank failures. Because of the special importance of well-functioning banks and 
bank credit to economic activity, banks are heavily regulated. For further details the 
reader is referred to Mishkin (1998). 
 
In the wake of the Asian crisis
2 of 1997/98, considered to be the most significant among 
the currency and banking/financial crises of the 1990s, and given the pernicious 
illiquidity attendant to those episodes, there has been renewed interest in the importance 
of banks’ access to liquid funding markets and sound bank liquidity management for the 
resilience of national financial systems and for the international financial system as well 
(Enoch et al., 2002; Keller et al., 2002; and World Bank Policy Report, 2001).
3 For 
instance, the working group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 22 
systemically at-risk countries deliberating ways for strengthening national financial 
systems emphasized the modalities for liquidity and coined the term “systemic liquidity” 
to refer to adequate arrangements and practices which permit efficient liquidity 
management and which provide a buffer during financial distress (Group of 22, 1998). In 
further elucidation of the term, Dziobek, Hobbs and Marston (2000, 2002), hereafter 
DHM, proffer that systemic liquidity can be viewed as the combination of bank liquidity 
management practices and the supporting liquidity infrastructure.  
 
Bank liquidity management practices are those confidence-enhancing practices aimed at 
providing the bank and its customers with the assurance that the bank’s liability 
obligations can be met as they become due without necessarily having to roll over these 
or postpone access to credit. In the event, the threat to the bank’s viability from loss of 
                                                 
2 Accounts of the causes of the Asian crisis may be gleaned from papers such as Berg and Patillo (1999), 
Corsetti et al. (1998a,b,c), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Montes (1998), and 
Radelet and Sachs (1998). Those dealing more specifically with Indonesia are Cole and Slade (1998), 
Djiwandono (2001) and Nasution (1999). 
3 The currency and banking/financial crises of the 1990s undoubtedly spawned a lot of theoretical and 
empirical literature on financial systems. The subset of the literature dealing with tools to recognize 
symptoms of financial crises may be divided into two: early warning systems (EWS) and balance sheet 
approaches. The EWS studies seek to outline the linkages between currency and banking/financial crises 
and identify and characterise the behaviour of likely leading indicators of currency crises for groups of 
nations and generalize from that (e.g., Eichengreen et al. 1995; Sachs et al. 1996; Frankel and Rose 1996; 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 1998; and Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998, 1999). Countries are lumped 
together thus masking the unique characteristics of each country’s experience. The balance-sheet-based 
studies investigate the liquidity risk and imbalances pertaining to asset-liability maturity and currency 
mismatches and capital structure distortions in the banking and corporate sectors as well as the 
government’s budget (e.g., Keller et al. 2002). Since the subjects in these latter studies are individual 
countries the policy recommendations may be better attuned to the countries’ unique characteristics. It is 
obvious that this study belongs to the balance-sheet genre. 
1 liquidity or confidence becomes a function of the volatility of funding relative to the 
liquidity of bank assets. Funding volatility refers to the likelihood that bank depositors or 
creditors will, in a short period of time, withdraw their funds or fail to roll them over at 
maturity in response to a perceived weakness in an individual bank or banking system. 
The term liquidity infrastructure is used to summarise (i) the design and adequacy of 
prudential rules and monetary instruments, (ii) the existence of legal contract rights and 
the efficiency of the court system, (iii) foreign exchange regulations, (iv) variability of 
interest rates, (v) exchange rates and (vi) safety-net provisions. DHM expound on these 
cogently. 
 
A balance-sheet-based indicator of funding volatility for the entire banking system 
advocated by DHM is funding volatility ratio (FVR) defined as the ratio of the difference 
between banks’ volatile liabilities and liquid assets to the banks’ illiquid assets. FVR 
reflects banks’ dependence on confidence-sensitive funds and is ostensibly closely linked 
to the six above-mentioned factors that affect a balanced liquidity infrastructure. DHM 
stress that estimated FVRs should be interpreted in the context of the infrastructure for 
liquidity management and hence in their analysis of the FVRs of the banking systems of 
14 countries covering the 1992-98 period they underscore the link by reporting for each 
country the average FVR for the study period and map out the infrastructure at end-1997. 
Difficulties with data issues are noted. Additionally, they outline the rudiments of a four-
quadrant classification scheme that can be used to categorise countries according to their 
scores on FVR (on the vertical axis) and some yet-to-be defined composite index of 
balanced infrastructure (on the horizontal axis). There is no explicit quantification of the 
link between FVR and the factors that affect a balanced liquidity infrastructure.  
 
Rather than interpreting the estimated FVR against the backdrop of the prevailing 
liquidity infrastructure, we are interested in the extent to which the FVR depends on the 
factors driving the liquidity infrastructure. Such an analytical endeavour can help 
delineate the relative importance of the various factors by way of the elasticity measures 
that can be calculated therefrom. In this study we seek to quantify that link for Indonesia, 
the country that suffered the most from the Asian crisis and is also one of the 14 countries 
investigated by DHM. We use monthly data covering 1990:01 to 2003:07 and employ 
cointegration techniques. To our knowledge no such study has been undertaken that can 
bring its unique insights to bear on the systemic liquidity policy in a country still having 
significant bank restructuring problems.
4 The study borrows heavily from DHM to 
construct the required variables but draws inspiration from Coe and Helpman (1995) who 
quantified the purported link between total factor productivity (TFP) and research and 
development (R&D) capital stocks for 21 OECD countries plus Israel during the period 
1971-90.  
 
In the rest of the paper, we discuss the construction and theoretical relationships among 
the variables and outline the main features of the chosen autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model in Section 2. A description of the data and the estimation procedures we 
took are recounted in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results and 
Section 5 contains the summary and conclusions. 
 
 
                                                 
4 See Pangestu and Habir (2002a,b) for a comprehensive up-to-date review of the performance, regulation 
and prospects of Indonesian banks. 
2 2. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The Funding Volatility Ratio 
 
DHM define funding volatility ratio as: 
 
FVR = (VL – LA) / (TA – LA) 
 
where VL is volatile liabilities; LA is liquid assets; and TA is total assets. With the caveat 
that the liquidity properties of assets and liabilities depend on the institutional setting 
DHM reported the following compositions of their variables: LA = cash + trading, short-
term marketable and government securities + claims due from banks; VL = total 
borrowed funds; and TA = reported assets + off-balance sheet items + consumer liabilities 
on acceptance and bills rediscounted. Given the available Indonesian data and 
institutional setting we constructed the constituent variables in the FVR formula in the 
following way: LA = cash + reserves + capital; VL = saving and demand deposits + 
foreign liabilities + import guarantees; and TA = total assets. 
 
The implications of the values that FVR can take are: FVR = 0 implies volatile liabilities 
are fully covered by liquid assets; FVR < 0 implies volatile liabilities are more than fully 
covered by liquid assets; and FVR > 0 implies volatile liabilities are not fully covered by 
liquid assets. Hence, positive, zero and negative values for FVR indicate, respectively, 
high, intermediate and low systemic liquidity risk.  
 
With respect to the dynamic behaviour of FVR we can note that since at period t, FVRt = 
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where the difference operator ∆ is used to denote discrete change in a variable. FVR 
decreases when the numerator gets smaller relative to the denominator, which can come 
about when either (i) LA increases and VL decreases or stays constant, or (ii) VL 
decreases and LA increases or stays constant; the converse of each of these statements is 
true. However, it is unclear what happens to the FVR when LA and VL move in the same 
direction; the net effect should depend on the relative magnitudes of change. The 
possibilities are: if the changes are both positive (i.e., ∆VL > 0 and ∆LA > 0) the FVR 
will increase if the change in VL exceeds the change in LA and decrease if the opposite is 
true; if the changes are both negative (i.e., ∆VL < 0 and ∆LA < 0) the FVR will decrease 
if the change in VL exceeds the change in LA and increase if the opposite is true. 
 
Determinants of the Liquidity Infrastructure 
 
For “the design and adequacy of prudential rules and monetary instruments”, DHM used 
a set of variables: a yes-no binary variable to reflect whether or not reserve requirement 
was in place; qualitative variables to reflect the level of development and efficacy of 
creditor rights and efficiency of the court system, and the restrictions on liquidity 
transformation imposed by authorities; and the turnover in markets for government 
securities to reflect the market depth of monetary instruments. A binary-variable 
treatment of reserve requirement may be appropriate in a cross sectional context but is 
3 inappropriate in time series context where there has always been reserve requirement. A 
market for government securities is inapplicable to Indonesia (as noted by DHM) and so 
we expanded the concept to cover the stock market. Financial innovations over the past 
few decades have meant the substitutability among various financial instruments has 
increased. For instance, Barnett and Liu (1995) and Drake and Chrystal (1997) note in 
studies on money demand in UK that estimates of cross elasticities between risky assets 
such as bonds and equity securities and “safe” assets such as cash or bank deposits range 
between 2 and 2.5. We therefore utilize the Jakarta stock market index to reflect the effect 
of non-bank financial instruments. Furthermore, to the extent that bank closures reflect 
enforcement of prudential rules we have taken the unprecedented step of using the 
number-of-banks variable to capture the requisite aspects of the design and adequacy of 
prudential rules.  
 
Under “foreign exchange regulations” DHM considered foreign liabilities:total asset ratio 
to be the ideal variable to reflect access to liquidity in foreign exchange but because of 
data unavailability used the proxy “foreign liabilities to foreign residents of money centre 
banks relative to total liabilities”. We, on the other hand, use the so-called ideal variable 
for foreign exchange regulations – the foreign liabilities:total asset ratio.
5 To reflect 
“variability of interest rates” we use real lending rate and for “exchange rates” we use the 
rupiah-US dollar nominal exchange rate. For “safety-net provisions” DHM used a yes-no 
binary variable to reflect whether or not an explicit deposit insurance scheme was in 
place. There is no explicit deposit insurance scheme in Indonesia. The closest initiative is 
the government’s blanket guarantee of banks’ third-party liabilities announced in 1998 to 
try to help stabilize the banking sector.
6 On that account we assume there is no usable 
variable to reflect changes in the safety net. Finally the study uses the capital:asset ratio as 
a catch-all term to reflect solvency, capital adequacy, bank distress, access to funding and 
bank management practice. 
 
At this juncture we provide the theoretical justification for the nominated explanatory 
variables. Firstly, capital: an increase in capital, other things remaining the same, leads to 
an increase in the capital:asset ratio, and in the FVR formula leads to an increase in LA 
that leads to a decrease in FVR. Secondly, number of banks: because of the widely-
known endemic poor corporate governance and regulatory environment in Indonesia, an 
increase in the number of banks is expected to increase/worsen the FVR. Thirdly, 
exchange rate: a depreciation of the domestic currency is tantamount to an increase in the 
value of foreign liabilities in terms of the domestic currency and this is expected to lead to 
an increase in VL and in FVR. Fourthly, foreign liabilities: an autonomous increase in 
foreign liabilities will lead to increases in both VL and LA because of reserve 
requirements and the practice of holding excess reserves. In that case FVR can either 
increase or decrease depending on which of VL and LA changes more/faster. If VL 
increases faster/more than LA, then FVR will be expected to increase; if LA increases 
faster/more than VL, then FVR will be expected to decrease. 
 
Fifthly, the stock market index: should investor optimism increase for some reason 
pushing up the stock market index, the concomitant increase in demand for stocks and 
bonds would imply a decrease in demand for bank deposits because of the hypothesized 
substitutability between these two sets of financial instruments. The reverse of the effect 
                                                 
5 A post-August 1997 dummy variable to reflect the switch to flexible exchange rate regime turned out to be 
insignificant. 
6 A dummy variable to capture the scheme proved ineffectual. 
4 of an autonomous increase in foreign liabilities applies here. Both VL and LA will fall but 
whether FVR will increase or decrease will depend on the relative magnitudes of change. 
If VL decreases faster/more than LA, then FVR will be expected to decrease; if LA 
decreases faster/more than VL, then FVR will be expected to increase. 
 
Lastly, interest rate. Since interest rates move in tandem, movements in a selected interest 
rate are conjectured to affect FVR through four channels: (i) “deposit effect”: an increase 
in the real interest rate invariably implies an increase in the deposit rate which can be 
expected to elicit an increase in savings deposits and foreign liabilities leading to 
increases in both VL and LA and unpredictable effect on FVR; (ii) “lending effect”: when 
the lending rate increases with other rates the decrease in demand for loans will lead to a 
decrease in TA (other things remaining the same) and subsequently an increase in FVR; 
(iii) “exchange rate effect”: an increase in the real interest rate in the Indonesian context 
is expected to intensify the depreciation of the domestic currency
7 which would mean the 
value in domestic currency of foreign liabilities increases leading to an increase in VL 
and further increase in the FVR; and (iv) “stock market effect”: an increase in real interest 
rate leading to decreases in bond prices can be expected to induce an increase in the 
demand for stocks and bonds and hence the stock market index which has an inconsistent 
effect on the FVR as noted earlier. Therefore in our context the net effect of interest rate 
is an empirical issue. 
 
The Model and Specification Issues 
 
Most economic time series have been found to be nonstationary or to have unit roots. 
Since the seminal work of Engle and Granger (1987) it has become customary when 
specifying regression models involving time series to check that the different variables 
are integrated of the same order, otherwise the regression might not make sense. A 
variable is said to be integrated of order d (i.e., I(d)) if it must be differenced d-times 
before it can be rendered stationary. Stationary variables are integrated of order zero (i.e., 
I(0)) and nonstationary variables are integrated of order equal to or greater than one (i.e., 
I(1) or I(>1)). A regression of one nonstationary variable on other nonstationary variables 
is deemed spurious unless the variables are cointegrated. A set of I(1) variables are said to 
be cointegrated if there exists a linear combination of them which is I(0). 
 
Assume that Yt = f(X1t, …., Xmt) and each variable is I(1). If the variables are 
cointegrated, the static regression, 
 
    t jt j
m
j






known as the cointegrating regression, does make sense and represents the long-run 
equilibrium relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. 
The coefficients represent the independent variables’ long-run impacts on the dependent 
variable. The concept of equilibrium here is that of no tendency to change. However, 
because of lagged responses among economic variables it is very likely that the short-run 
                                                 
7 This flows from both the flexible-price and sticky-price variants of the monetary model of exchange rates 
in which increases in domestic real interest rates leading to large domestic-foreign real interest rate 
differentials imply a higher expected domestic inflation rate (rather than a relative shortage of liquidity in 
the domestic money market) giving rise to capital outflows and hence domestic currency depreciation 
(Moosa 2000 p. 116). 
5 impacts of the independent variables will be different from their long-run impacts and 
therefore the short-run value or behaviour of the dependent variable may be different 
from its long-run value or behaviour resulting in a short-run disequilibrium captured by 
the error term et. How the disequilibrium is eliminated from the short run to the long run 
needs to be modeled. One approach to dealing with the nonstationary variables is to 
difference the variables but the differencing procedure leads to the loss of important 
information pertaining to the long-run relationships. According to the Granger 
representation theorem (Harvey 1993, p. 260), if I(1) variables are cointegrated the short-
run dynamics corresponding to the long-run equilibrium can be described by the error 
correction model (ECM). The ECM can be estimated in the two-step procedure suggested 
by Engel and Granger (1987). After establishing that the variables are cointegrated, the 
long-run cointegrating regression is estimated and the lagged residuals saved. Then the 
ECM is estimated by regressing the first difference of the dependent variable on its own 
lags, the distributed lags of the first differences of the independent variables plus the 
lagged residuals from the cointegrating regression used as the error correction term. At 
the most general level the ECM
8 may be represented as 
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where p is the optimal lag of the dependent variable; qj is the optimal lag of the j
th 
independent variable; êt-1 is the error correction term and its coefficient, λ, is the speed-of-
adjustment coefficient. It must be noted that λ which gives the proportion of the 
disequilibrium eliminated in one period has the range –1 ≤  λ < 0. The optimal lag 
structure may be selected based on the scores from one or more of the conventional 
model selection criteria such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC). 
 
Bewley (1979) and Wickens and Breusch (1988) had shown that the two-step estimation 
procedure suggested by Engle and Granger of sequentially estimating the long-run and 
the short-run parameters is unnecessary (Maddala 1992 p. 263). They argued that more 
efficient long-run parameters can be obtained if the long-run and short-run parameters are 
estimated simultaneously. Banerjee et al. (1986) have also suggested that it is better to 
estimate the long-run parameters through a dynamic model. It will be realized that the 
static long-run model can be turned into a dynamic short-run model by adding lags of the 
dependent variable (making it autoregressive) and lags of the independent variables (thus 
imparting distributed-lag characteristics) and yielding an equation such as: 
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that is termed the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model
9 with the optimal lag 
structure ARDL(p, q1, …. qm). The selection of the optimal lag structure of the ARDL 
model can also be based on model selection criteria such as the AIC or the SBC. The 
                                                 
8 Some variants of the ECM may not incorporate lags of the (first difference of the) dependent variable. 
9 The ARDL can equivalently be re-specified as the ECM or formulated as the Bardsen transformation or 
the Bewley transformation each of which incorporates both the short-run and long-run impacts. For these 
specifications see, for example, Maddala and Kim (1998, Ch. 2), Banerjee et al. (1993, Ch. 2), Hendry 
(1995, Ch. 6) and Patterson (2000, Ch. 8). 
6 short-run or impact multiplier of the j
th independent variable is given by the estimated 
coefficient δj0 in the ARDL. The long-run coefficients contingent on the ARDL estimates 
can be calculated from the following formulae: 
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and the adjustment coefficient:  ( ) 1 1 − ∑ = = k
p
k γ λ . 
 
An econometric/time series software that automatically and conveniently selects an 
optimal ARDL lag structure for each of several model selection criteria after the 
researcher has set the maximum lag length is MICROFIT (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). 
An additional advantage of the MICROFIT approach is that it can be applied without 
needing to know the order(s) of integration of the variables even when the variables are a 
mixture of I(0)’s and I(1)’s.  
 
As enunciated by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) the MICROFIT ARDL procedure involves 
two stages. At the first stage an F-test is done to ensure that a long-run relationship exists 
between the variables. To operationalise this non-standard F-statistic, Pesaran et al. 
(1996) have tabulated the appropriate critical values for different numbers of regressors 
when all the variables are I(1) and when all the variables are I(0), thus catering for 
fractionally integrated variables as well. If the computed F-statistic is greater (smaller) 
than the upper (lower) critical value, it can be inferred that the variables are cointegrated 
(not cointegrated) irrespective of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1). If the computed F-
statistic falls within the critical value band, the “inconclusive zone”, the order(s) of 
integration of the variables need to be checked before the correct inference can be made. 
After ascertaining that a genuine long-run relationship exists between the variables the 
procedure moves to the second stage where the ARDL option is implemented and 
inferences made about the resulting short-run and long-run coefficients. This study 




For the Indonesian data if we let V = funding volatility ratio, R = real interest rate, X = 
exchange rate, S = stock market index, B = number of banks, K = banks’ capital:total 
asset ratio, and F = banks’ foreign liabilities:total asset ratio
10 we can express the 
relationship between the volatility ratio and the other variables in a general way as: Vt = 
f(Rt, Xt, St, Bt, Kt, Ft). To capture the absolute effects on the volatility ratio by relative or 
                                                 
10 We use compact notations such as V, R, X, S, B, K and F to represent the variables in the exposition of 
the theoretical model. Later, in dealing with the empirical data, we shift from the single-letter names to 
multiple-letter and more mnemonic names for the variables. 
7 proportional changes in R, X, S and B and by absolute changes in K and F we postulate 
the following theoretical long-run equilibrium model
11: 
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which simplifies to 
 
 V t = β0 + β1 ln Rt + β2 ln Xt + β3 ln St + β4 ln Bt + β5Kt + β6Ft + et
 
where et is the random error term. For the reasons given earlier, it is hypothesized that 
number of banks and exchange rate will take positive coefficients; capital:asset ratio will 
take a negative coefficient; and the signs of the coefficients of interest rate, stock market 
index and foreign liabilities:total asset ratio are to be determined empirically.  And from 
the foregoing, it can be inferred that the theoretical ARDL(p, qR, qX, qS, qB, qK, qF) can be 
written as: 
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The empirical model should yield estimates of the various coefficients and optimal lags. 
Needless to add, the empirical model should pass some diagnostic tests for the statistical 
inferences to be valid. 
 
 
3. THE DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES 
 
The Data and Sources 
 
Monthly data on the variables covering the period January 1990 to July 2003 were 
obtained from the Indonesian central bank, Bank Indonesia (BI). The variables and the 
mnemonic names given them from this stage onwards are: the volatility ratio 
(VOLRATIO); the real lending rate (to represent interest rate) (INTRATE); the rupiah-
US dollar exchange rate (EXCHRATE); the Jakarta stock market index (STKMKT); the 
number of banks (BANKS); the capital:asset ratio (CAPASETR); and foreign 
liabilities:total asset ratio (FLBASETR). 
 
The variables’ time series are plotted in Figures 1 and 2 and their arithmetic means, 
standard deviations, and the minimum and maximum values are reported in Table 1. 
Apart from STKMKT, which seems to have oscillated in an independent fashion 
throughout the sample period, the gyrations in the other time series became more 
dramatic during the last quarter of 1997 and the “crisis years” of 1998 and 1999. The 
post-crisis levels of EXCHRATE are characteristically higher than the pre-crisis levels; 
BANKS rose and fell but the other variables seemed to have returned to their pre-crisis 
levels after the year 2000.  
                                                 
11 Many economic theories have log-linear long-run equilibrium solutions. However, a strictly log-linear 
model is inappropriate in this study because some of the variables (e.g., the volatility ratio and capital:asset 
ratio) take negative values, and negative numbers do not have logarithms. 













































































































VOLRATIO INTRATE FLBASETR CAPASETR
 
oncerning actual magnitudes, Table 1 reports that VOLRATIO averaged about 72% and 
liquidity management of Indonesian banks. 















































































































never went below 53% or above 115%. CAPASETR ranged between negative 40% and 
positive10% and averaged only about positive 5%. Whereas INTRATE fluctuated 
between 8% and 60% averaging about 18%, STKMKT swung between 226 and 725 
posting an average of 462 points. Averaging 195, BANKS varied between 138 and 241. 
From a low of about 1,800 Rp/US$1, EXCHRATE reached an all-time high of 14,900 in 
June 1998 and averaged about 5,000. That FLBASETR averaged nearly 9% fluctuating 
within a range of 3% and 20% means foreign liabilities played a significant role in the 
9 Table 1 
Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Variable Mean  Std  deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
VOLRATIO  0.71917     0.10224       0.53709        1.1146 
INTRATE  1          7.943   9.6473        8.4300      60.650 
EXCHRATE  503 353 180 1490 7.6       4.8        8.0         0.0 
STKMKT  4 11 22 7 62.44       1.76        6.68         24.55 
BANKS  195       37.208       138          241 
CAPASETR       44  0.05224  0.08831     -0.41128  0.102
FLBASETR  23    9765  0.087 0.02961 0.02559 0.1
T e: VOLRA ility r TE =  g rate (%); TE = 
e Rupiah per  ); STKM ck market ANKS = n ks; 
 the variables is reported as Table 2. The large linear correlations (i.e., |ρ| ≥ 0.5) are 
orrelation Matrix of the Variables 
 VOLRATIO  INTRATE  EXCHRATE  STKMKT BANKS  CAPASETR
he variables ar TIO = volat atio; INTRA real lendin  EXCHRA
xchange rate ( US dollar KT = sto  index; B umber of ban
CAPASETR = capital:asset ratio; and FLBASETR = foreign liabilities:total asset ratio. 
 
For a preliminary idea about the co-movements between variables, the correlation matrix 
of
between VOLRATIO and CAPASETR (negative), VOLRATIO and EXCHRATE 
(positive), EXCHRATE and BANKS (negative) and between FLBASETR and INTRATE 
(positive). The configuration of the signs also suggests VOLRATIO correlates positively 





VOLRATIO   1.00000           
INTRATE   0.06688      1.00000         
EXCHRATE   0.60353       0.21315      1.00000       
STKMKT   0.24906     -0.21815  -0.05005   1.00000     
BANKS  -0.27703   0.17346     -0.58234  0.16924    1.00000   
CAPASETR  0.18655      1.00000  -0.76242 -0.35384 -0.34740 -0.05181 
FLBASETR  - -0.49028    0.25289    0.62883    0.23241  0.04237 0.38368 
T : V  = v io;   real  ; E    
r  U KM  m  BANK r  A  
 we performed a test of the 
resence of stable/identifiable seasonality with the Census X-11 additive seasonal 
he variables are OLRATIO olatility rat INTRATE = lending rate XCHRATE = exchange
ate (Rupiah per S dollar); ST KT = stock arket index; S = numbe of banks; C PASETR =
capital:asset ratio; and FLBASETR = foreign liabilities:total asset ratio. 
 
To check the strength of seasonality among the variables,
p
adjustment program in E-VIEWS (1998). For the null of stable seasonality, the F-test 
scores (F(11,151)) obtained for the variables are: VOLRATIO, 2.176; INTRATE, 3.931; 
EXCHRATE, 1.447; STKMKT, 4.655; BANKS, 0.903; CAPASETR, 2.509; and 
FLBASETR, 2.267. The critical values at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, are F(0.10; 
11,200) = 1.60 and F(0.05; 11,200) = 1.84. Hence, the null of stable seasonality is rejected for 
VOLRATIO, INTRATE, STKMKT, CAPASETR and FLBASETR but cannot be rejected 
for EXCHRATE and BANKS. Because it is not certain that all the of variables can be 
reliably adjusted, and because a regression of a seasonally unadjusted dependent variable 
on a seasonally adjusted variable does not make sense (Maddala 1992, p. 592) we decided 
to analyse and report the results for the seasonally unadjusted variables. 
 
10 From the foregoing, therefore, the variables in the empirical model are: 
 
VOLRATIO = volatility ratio (in decimals) 
LNRIRATE = natural logarithm of the real lending rate 
LNEXRATE = natural logarithm of the exchange rate Rupiah per US dollar 
LNSTKMKT = natural logarithm of the Jakarta stock market index 
LNBANKS = natural logarithm of the number of banks 
CAPASETR = capital:asset ratio (in decimals) 
FLBASETR =foreign liabilities:total asset ratio (in decimals) 
 
And the empirical long-run model to be estimated is: 
 
VOLRATIOt = β0 + β1 LNRIRATEt + β2 LNEXRATEt + β3 LNSTKMKTt  




The estimation of the regression coefficients employs the MICROFIT ARDL procedure 
for cointegration. As mentioned earlier, the MICROFIT approach to estimating the 
ARDL involves firstly the F-test to ascertain that a long-run relationship does exist 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Following that, the short-
run coefficients are estimated and out of them the long-run coefficients are calculated. 
Because monthly data have been used in this study the maximum lag length was set at 12 
(Hamilton, 1994, p. 583). 
 
The F-test yielded a value of 3.2494 which falls within both the critical value bands of 
2.141 and 3.250 (at the 10% level of significance) and 2.476 and 3.646 (at the 5% level of 
significance), respectively, for the case of 6 regressors with intercept and no trend. Thus, 
the inference of long-run relationship is inconclusive and depends on whether the 
underlying variables are I(0) or I(1) or fractionally integrated. To test for the order of 
integration in the variables the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
unit root tests were implemented; the results are presented in Table 4. Based on the PP 
results at the 5% level of significance, all the variables are declared to be I(1)
12. 
Furthermore, to test for cointegration among the variables, the Johansen procedure was 
applied and the eigenvalue and trace test results are provided in Table 5. Since the first 
null (of r = 0) is rejected and the second null (of r ≤ 1) is not rejected at the 10% level, it 
                                                 
12 There are some conflicting results from the ADF and PP tests: at both the 10% and 5% levels of 
significance, ADF declares LNRIRATE to be I(0) but PP declares it to be I(1); ADF declares LNSTKMKT 
to be I(1) at both the 10% and 5% levels but PP declares it to be I(0) at the 10% level but I(1) at the 5% 
level. Where there is inconsistency between the ADF and PP results, the conclusion from the PP test is to be 
preferred because the ADF test is based on the assumption that the series is generated by an autoregressive 
(AR) process whilst the PP test is based on the more general autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) process (Schwert, 1989; Lin, 1995).  
11 is concluded that the variables are cointegrated with one cointegrating vector (or that 




Unit Root Test Results (Sample Period: Jan 1990 – Jul 2003) 
Levels First  Differences   
Variable  ADF PP  ADF  PP 
VOLRATIO -2.0051 -2.0774  -4.1079 -11.545 
LNRIRATE -3.1225 -1.8263 -3.0680  -10.580 
LNEXRATE -0.9753  -0.8600  -3.9334 -11.190 






CAPASETR -2.1610 -2.2874 -3.8884  -10.981 
FLBASETR -2.1489 -2.4404 -4.6714  -11.175 
All variables are ‘constant, no trend’ except LNBANKS which is ‘constant with trend’ (indicated with 
superscript ‘cwt’). Critical values for ‘constant, no trend’ = -2.57(10%); -2.90(5%). Critical values for 
‘constant with trend’ = -3.13(10%); -3.43(5%) 
 
Table 5 
The Johansen Cointegration Test Results (Sample Period: Jan 1990 – Jul 2003) 
Eigenvalue  Null Hypothesis  Trace Test  p-value 
0.45814  r = 0  131.87265  0.08859 
0.37142 r  ≤ 1    90.81896  0.29341 
0.28492 r  ≤ 2    59.71095  0.52573 
0.19105 r  ≤ 3    37.24176  0.60338 
0.13979 r  ≤ 4    23.03657  0.47616 
0.11296 r  ≤ 5    12.94796   0.23729 
0.07076 r  ≤ 6      4.91730  0.02403 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the SBC, the optimal ARDL model selected by MICROFIT is ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0, 
3, 1, 1). The SBC was preferred because it is more parsimonious than the other popular 
criterion, the AIC. The empirical results are furnished in Tables 6 - 9. Table 6 gives the 
results for the empirical ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0, 3, 1, 1) model and contains the short-run 
coefficients. From the accompanying summary statistics of the R
2, the
2 R and  the             
F-statistic, the selected ARDL(·) model has a good fit. The model also passes a battery of 
diagnostic tests indicating there are no serious problems with serial correlation, functional 
form and heteroskedasticity.  
 
                                                 
13 The use of the maximum lag length of 12 because of the monthly data means the effective sample period 
is January 1991 to July 2003. To estimate an ARDL model for m-independent variables and a specified lag 
length h, MICROFIT needs to run h(h+1)
m regressions before choosing the optimal model. In our context 
where h = 12 and m = 6, the number of regressions to be run is 12(13
6) = 57,921,708. This is impractical, 
and indeed no results could be obtained after 9 days continuous running of our PC; apparently MICROFIT 
simply crashed under such a task. The practical approach taken was to run the model sequentially from lag 
12 downward for the same effective period. No results could be obtained for lags 5 or greater. Results for 
lag 3 were the same as for lag 4 and were an improvement over the results for lags 1 and 2. The results 
reported and interpreted in the study are those for lag 3. Since the diagnostic test results were favourable it 
is our contention that these results are plausible and that the potential cost of effecting lag 12 would far 
outweigh the benefit of getting “more precise” coefficients. 
12 Table 6 
Regression Results of the Selected ARDL(1,0,0,0,3,1,1) Model 
Variable  Coefficient  Std Error  T-ratio       [Prob] 
INTERCPT  -0.25411             0.10468    -2.4275  [0.016] 
VOLRATIO–1  0.74364             0.052878             14.0633  [0.000] 
LNRIRATE   0.0008523         0.0044319           0.19232  [0.848] 
LNEXRATE   0.019831           0.0053937           3.6766  [0.000] 
LNSTKMKT   0.014544           0.0086339           1.6846  [0.094] 
LNBANKS  -0.018447           0.064759             -0.2849  [0.776] 
LNBANKS-1  0.047152           0.083748             0.5630  [0.574] 
LNBANKS-2 -0.22085             0.083216             -2.6539  [0.009] 
LNBANKS-3  0.23909             0.062381             3.8328  [0.000] 
CAPASETR  -0.71311             0.048998             -14.5539  [0.000] 
CAPASETR-1  0.45134             0.067931             6.6441  [0.000] 
FLBASETR  -0.10130             0.15493               -0.6538  [0.514] 
FLBASETR-1 -0.44344             0.15370               -2.8852  [0.005] 
Test statistics 
R
2 = 0.9760; 
2 R  = 0.9739; SSE = .015653; F(12,138) = 468.0230[0.000];  
LM χ
2(12) = 18.3574[0.105]; RESET χ
2(1) = 0.63271[0.426];  
JBN χ
2(2) = 3975.5[0.000]; ARCH χ
2(1) = 1.0544[0.304] 
Notes 
Selection was based on the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC.) Dependent variable is VOLRATIO. 
Subscript after a variable identifies the lag. 
The test statistics are: R
2 = coefficient of determination; 
2 R  = R
2 adjusted for degrees of freedom; 
SSE = standard error of the estimate; F(.) = F-statistic; LM = Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial 
correlation; RESET = Ramsey’s RESET test for functional form; JBN = Jarque-Bera test for the normality 
of the residuals; ARCH = Engle’s Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity test. The p-values of the 
relevant statistics are shown in the square brackets after the estimates. 
 
It can be noticed from the regression results of the selected ARDL(·) model in Table 6 
that one-period lags of VOLRATIO, CAPASETR and FLBASETR and up to three period 
lags of LNBANKS were picked as the additional variables in the estimated ARDL model. 
The coefficient of lagged volatility ratio VOLRATIO–1 (= 0.74364) implies an adjustment 
coefficient of –0.25636 (= 0.74364 – 1). This is corroborated by the coefficient of the 
error correction term ECT–1 in the error correction representation of the selected ARDL(·) 
reported in Table 7. At the statistically significant value of –0.25636, the adjustment 
coefficient suggests that a little more than a quarter of the discrepancy between the long-
run equilibrium value and the current value of the volatility ratio is corrected within one 
month. This may be viewed as a moderate speed of adjustment. The t-ratios of the other 
variables suggest that the immediate (same-month) impacts of changes in the interest rate, 
stock market index, number of banks and foreign liabilities are not statistically significant 
but those of exchange rate and capital:asset ratio are statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. Table 8 gives the long-run coefficients corresponding to the selected 
ARDL(·) model and Table 9 reports the estimated short-run and long-run elasticities 
calculated at the arithmetic means of the respective variables. The rest of the discussion 
will focus on the contents of Tables 6, 8 and 9. 
 
13 Table 7 
Error Correction Representation for the Selected ARDL(1,0,0,0,3,1,1) Model 
Variable  Coefficient  Std Error  T-ratio     [Prob] 
INTERCPT  -0.25411           0.10468               -2.4275  [0.016] 
∆LNRIRATE  0.0008523       0.0044319           0.1923  [0.848] 
∆LNEXRATE   0.019831         0.0053937           3.6766  [0.000] 
∆LNSTKMKT   0.014544         0.0086339           1.6846  [0.094] 
∆LNBANKS  -0.018447         0.064759             -0.2847  [0.776] 
∆LNBANKS-1 -0.018243         0.062235             -0.2931  [0.770] 
∆LNBANKS-2 -0.23909           0.062381             -3.8328  [0.000] 
∆CAPASETR  -0.71311           0.048998             -14.5539  [0.000] 
∆FLBASETR  -0.10130           0.15493               -0.6538  [0.514] 




2 R  = 0.69469; SSE = 0.015653;  F(9, 141) =   39.2555[0.000] 
Notes 
Dependent variable is ∆VOLRATIO. ∆ is first difference operator. ECT-1 = error correction term. 
 
Table 8 
The Long Run Coefficients Estimated from the Selected ARDL(1,0,0,0,3,1,1) Model 
Variable  Coefficient  Std Error  T-ratio     [Prob] 
INTERCPT  -0.99124              0.38763               -2.5571  [0.012] 
LNRIRATE   0.0033248    0.017346             0.1917  [0.848] 
LNEXRATE   0.077356             0.016150             4.7898  [0.000] 
LNSTKMKT   0.056736             0.028023             2.0246  [0.045] 
LNBANKS   0.18313             0.071386             2.5654  [0.011] 
CAPASETR  -1.0211              0.092008             -11.0980  [0.000] 
FLBASETR  -2.1249               0.39759               -5.3445  [0.000] 
 
The regression results indicate that apart from interest rate the rest of the variables are 
statistically significant determinants of the volatility ratio of Indonesian banks. The 
statistical insignificance of interest rate belies that variable’s economic and model-
specification import. When interest rate is dropped from the model, the stable long-run 
relationship between volatility ratio and the nominated determinants ceases to exist as the 
null of non-cointegration can no longer be rejected in the Johansen cointegration test and 
the F-test score in the MICROFIT ARDL procedure falls below the lower limits of the 
critical bands. For these reasons interest rate is retained in the model. 
 
The long-run coefficients confirm that the liquidity risk of the Indonesian banking system 
is worsened by increases in the rupiah-US dollar exchange rate, the Jakarta stock market 
index, the number of banks and interest rate but lowered by increases in bank capital and 
foreign currency accounts. These empirical results accord with the a priori expectations 
about the exchange rate, capital and number of banks and resolve the ambiguities initially 
expressed about the interest rate, stock market index and foreign liabilities.  
 
The net positive effect of the stock market index on the volatility ratio suggests that 
optimism in the stock market leading to portfolio adjustments by investors further leads to 
banks’ liquid assets falling faster than their volatile liabilities. And the fact that 
FLBASETR takes a negative coefficient (in both the short run and long run) indicates that 
banks’ liquid assets increase much faster than their volatile liabilities as banks acquire 
foreign currency accounts. These two conclusions imply that liquid assets (LA) is much 
14 more reactive than volatile liabilities (VL) when the two of them are responding in the 
same direction to a stimulus. A check of their time series reveals that LA has a coefficient 
of variation of 1.548 whilst VL has 0.723, underscoring the greater relative variability of 
LA. Concerning interest rate, it can be inferred from what has just been said about the 
relative variability of LA and VL that in the context of our model the “deposit effect” is 
negative and the “stock market effect” is positive. Consequently, the overall positive 
effect of interest rate implies that the joint positive exchange rate, lending and stock 
market effects “outweigh” the negative deposit effect. What this helps to clarify is that the 
policy of increasing interest rate to defend the rupiah has deleterious effect on the FVR 
and is generally misguided because it is based on the mistaken notion about the 
expectations formation mechanism that domestic interest rate hikes, relative to foreign 
interest rates, signal a relative shortage of liquidity in the domestic money market rather 
than a higher expected domestic inflation rate. 
 
After those observations our interpretations of the magnitudes of the estimated multipliers 
now ensue. Considering first the two variables whose slope coefficients measure the 
absolute change in VOLRATIO induced by a given absolute change in the value of the 
respective variable, an increase of one-hundredth of a point (i.e., 0.01 or 1 percentage 
point) in CAPASETR induces a decrease of 0.007131 (or about 0.71 percentage point) in 
VOLRATIO in the short run and 0.010211 (or about 1 percentage point) in the long run; a 
similar increase in FLBASETR induces a decrease of 0.001013 (or about 0.1 percentage 
point) in VOLRATIO in the short run and 0.021249 (or about 2 percentage points) in the 
long run. The long-run multipliers for CAPASETR and FLBASETR are, respectively, 1.5 
times and 20 times the magnitudes of their short-run counterparts. 
 
Among the remaining four variables (whose slope coefficients measure the absolute 
change in VOLRATIO induced by a relative/percent change in the value of the respective 
variable) the short-run and long-run coefficients of LNRIRATE, although statistically 
insignificant, connote that if the interest rate increases by 1%, VOLRATIO would 
increase by the imperceptible amount of 0.0008523 (or about 0.09 of a percentage point) 
in the short run and by 0.003248 (or about 0.3 of a percentage point) in the long run. 
Those for LNEXRATE mean that if the exchange rate depreciates by 1%, VOLRATIO 
would increase by 0.019831 (or nearly 2 percentage points) in the short run and by 
0.077356 (or nearly 8 percentage points) in the long run. Concerning LNSTKMKT the 
estimated coefficients suggest that 1% increase in the stock market index would induce an 
increase of 0.014544 (or nearly 1.5 percentage points) in VOLRATIO in the short run and 
0.056736 (or nearly 6 percentage points) in the long run. Comparatively, the long-run 
multipliers of interest rate, the exchange rate and the stock market index are 4 times the 
sizes of the corresponding short-run estimates. And finally, regarding LNBANKS, if the 
number of banks increases by 1%, VOLRATIO is expected to decrease immediately by 
0.018447 points (or nearly 2 percentage points), fluctuate in the interim period and over 
the long haul rise by 0.18313 (or about 18 percentage points). Conversely, the reduction 
in the number of banks (presumably from the closure or liquidation of insolvent ones) 
impairs the liquidity risk in the short term but engenders improvement in the long term. 
 
A noteworthy aspect of the empirical ARDL model is the selection/incorporation of 
multiple lags of LNBANKS. That the multiplier is negative for the current period and 
alternates thereafter warrants a comment or two. The negative current-period multiplier of 
LNBANKS captures the likelihood that the advent of new banks augments total bank 
capital instantaneously thus lowering the volatility ratio in the same month. Later, after 
15 the banks have had time to attract deposits and extend loans, the ups and downs of the 
business of financial intermediation manifest themselves in the fluctuating impacts on the 
volatility ratio in subsequent periods. Over the long term, however, the increase in 
number of banks worsens the aggregate volatility ratio perhaps because of endemic 
weaknesses in the banking sector. This finding gives further credence to the observation 
by several commentators that Indonesia has too many banks. 
 
To help put these differentiated impacts on a much more comparable footing reference is 
made to the average elasticities
14 reported in Table 9. As is to be expected, the long-run 
elasticities are bigger than their respective short-run counterparts for all the variables. 
From the elasticity estimates it can be concluded that the variable having the largest 
proportional impact on volatility ratio in the short run is capital:asset ratio (followed by 
exchange rate and number of banks), but the variable having the largest impact in the long 
term is foreign liabilities:asset ratio (followed closely by number of banks). Attention is 
drawn to the finding that the long-run elasticity of number of banks is greater in absolute 
value than that of capital:asset ratio. The implications of the estimated elasticities for 
policy are that to reduce liquidity risk in the short term the primary focus should be on 
increasing bank capital. Stemming or reversing the depreciation of the domestic currency 
has desirable outcome on volatility ratio but it should not be done via increases in the 
interest rate. Reducing or rationalizing the number of banks temporarily impairs the 
liquidity risk but it eventually yields significant long-term benefits. Over the long term 
those confidence-building steps that translate into increases in and retention of foreign-
currency accounts will do the most to lower the liquidity risk of Indonesian banks. 
 
Table 9 
Estimated Short-run and Long-run Average Elasticities 
 
Variable  Time 
horizon  INTRATE EXCHRATE STKMKT BANKS CAPASETR FLBASETR 
Short-run 0.0012  0.0276  0.0202  -0.0257  -0.0518  -0.0123 
Long-run 0.0046  0.1076  0.0789    0.2546  -0.0742  -0.2577 
The variables are: VOLRATIO = volatility ratio; INTRATE = real lending rate; EXCHRATE = exchange 
rate (rupiah per US dollar); STKMKT = stock market index; BANKS = number of banks; 
CAPASETR = capital:asset ratio; and FLBASETR = foreign liabilities:total asset ratio. 
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Illiquidity is at the core of the various recent national and regional financial market crises 
that have threatened the international financial system and consequently there has been 
renewed interest in prudent bank liquidity management. In the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis the term “systemic liquidity” has been coined to refer to adequate 
arrangements and practices which permit efficient liquidity management and which 
provide a buffer during financial distress. Hence, systemic liquidity can be viewed as the 
combination of bank liquidity management practices and the supporting liquidity 
infrastructure. The variable funding volatility ratio [FVR] (reflecting banks’ dependence 
on confidence-sensitive funds) captures the essence of systemic liquidity risk and is 
                                                 
14 If the j
th independent variable Xj is non-logged, the elasticity is estimated as Єj = βj(Xj*/Y*); if it is 
logged the elasticity is estimated as Єj = βj(1/Y*) where βj is the estimated coefficient for Xj, Xj* represents 
the mean value for Xj and Y* represents the mean value for the dependent variable. For further clarification 
see Gujarati 2003, p. 190 or Griffiths, Hill and Judge 1993, p. 260. 
16 logically closely linked to the factors that affect a balanced liquidity infrastructure: the 
design of prudential and monetary instruments, existence of legal contract rights and the 
efficiency of the court system, foreign exchange regulations, variability of interest rates, 
exchange rates and safety-net provisions. Hitherto, the research practice has been to 
interpret estimated FVRs against the backdrop of the characteristics of the liquidity 
infrastructure. 
 
This study set out to quantify the relationship between FVR and the measurable 
determinants of a balanced liquidity infrastructure in a dynamic framework for Indonesia, 
the country worst affected by the Asian crisis of 1997/98. Monthly data covering the 
period January 1990 to July 2003 were analysed employing the MICROFIT ARDL 
(autoregressive distributed lag) approach to cointegration that effects the recommended 
simultaneous estimation of the short-run and long-run coefficients in a dynamic 
regression model. A good fit and favourable diagnostic test results were obtained for the 
model that yielded credible estimates of the short-run and long-run multipliers and 
elasticities. The regression results show that FVR is increasing in exchange rate, the 
Jakarta stock market index, interest rate and the number of banks, and decreasing in 
capital:asset ratio and foreign liabilities:total asset ratio. To reduce the FVR in the short 
term the best option lies with increasing bank capital. Over the long term enduring 
increases in foreign-currency accounts and reduction in the number of banks seem to hold 
the greatest prospects for lowering the FVR. 
17 18 REFERENCES 
 
Banerjee, A., Dolado, J. J., Hendry D. F. and Smith, G. W. (1986). Exploring equilibrium 
relationships in econometrics through static models: Some Monte Carlo evidence, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 48, 253-278. 
Banerjee, A., Dolado, J. J., Galbraith, J. W. and Hendry D. F. (1993). Co-integration, 
error correction and the econometric analysis of non-stationary data. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
Bank Indonesia. Statistik ekonomi dan keuangan Indonesia (The Indonesian Economic 
and Financial Statistics), various issues. Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Barnett, W. and Liu, Y. (1995). The CAMP – Extended divisia monetary aggregate with 
exact tracking under risk (Working Paper No. 195). University of Washington, 
Department of Economics: St. Louis. 
Berg, A. and Patillo, C. (1999). Are currency crises predictable? A test, IMF Staff Papers, 
40(2), 107-138. 
Bewley, R. (1979). The direct estimation of the equilibrium response in a linear dynamic 
model, Economic Letters, 3, 357-361. 
Coe, D. T. and Helpman, E. (1995). International R & D spillovers, European Economic 
Review, 39, 859-887. 
Cole, D. C. and Slade, B. F. (1998). Why has Indonesia’s financial crisis been so bad? 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 34(2), 61-66. 
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P. and Roubini, N. (1998a). Paper tigers? A model of the Asian 
crisis (NBER Working Paper No. 6783). National Bureau of Economic Research: 
Cambridge, MA. 
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P. and Roubini, N. (1998b). What caused the Asian currency and 
financial crises? Part I: A macroeconomic overview (NBER Working Paper No. 
6833). National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA. 
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P. and Roubini, N. (1998c). What caused the Asian currency and 
financial crises? Part II The policy debate (NBER Working Paper No. 6834). 
National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA. 
Djiwandono, S. (2001). Mengelola Bank Indonesia dalam masa krisi (Managing Bank 
Indonesia in the crisis period) (LP3ES). Jakarta. 
Drake, L. and Chrystal, K. A. (1997). Personal sector money demand in the UK, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 49(2), 188-206. 
Dziobek, C., Hobbs, J. K. and Marston, D. (2000). Toward a framework for systemic 
liquidity policy (IMF Working Paper No. WP/00/34). International Monetary Fund: 
Washington DC. 
Dziobek, C., Hobbs, J. K. and Marston, D. (2002). Toward a framework for systemic 
liquidity policy, in Enoch, C. et al. (Eds.). Building Strong Banks Through 
Surveillance and Resolution. International Monetary Fund: Washington DC. 
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A. K. and Wyplosz, C. (1995). Exchange market mayhem: The 
antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks, Economic Policy, 21, 249-312. 
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. J. (1987). Cointegration and error correction: 
Representations, estimation and testing, Econometrica, 55, 252-276. 
Enoch, C., Taylor, M. W. and Marston, D. (Eds.). (2002). Building strong banks through 
surveillance and resolution. International Monetary Fund: Washington DC. 
E-Views. (1998). Quantitative Micro Software, Irvine, CA. 
Frankel, J. A. and Rose, A. K. (1996). Currency crashes in emerging markets: An 
empirical treatment, Journal of International Economics, 41, 351-366. 
19 Furman, J. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1998). Economic crisis: Evidence and insights from East 
Asia, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1-135. 
Griffiths, W. E., Hill, R. C. and Judge, G. G. (1993). Learning and practicing 
econometrics. John Wiley and Sons: New York. 
Group of 22. (1998). Report of the working group on strengthening financial systems,    
G-22. Washington DC. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2003). Basic econometrics (4
th  ed.). McGraw-Hill: New York. 
Hamilton J. D. (1994). Time series analysis. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 
Harvey, A. C. (1993). Time series models (2
nd ed.). Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hemel 
Hempstead, UK. 
Hendry, D. F. (1995). Dynamic econometrics. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Kaminsky, G. L., Lizondo, S. and Reinhart, C. M. (1998). Leading indicators of currency 
crises, IMF Staff Papers, 45(1), 1-48. 
Kaminsky, G. L. and Reinhart, C. M. (1998). Financial crises in Asia and Latin America: 
Then and now, American Economic Review, 88(2), 444-448. 
Kaminsky, G. L. and Reinhart, C. M. (1999). The twin crises: The causes of banking and 
balance of payments problems, American Economic Review, 89(3), 473-500. 
Keller, C., Rosenberg, C., Roubini, N. and Setser, B. (2002). The bottom line, Finance 
and Development, December. International Monetary Fund: Washington DC. 
Lin, C. A. (1995). More evidence on Wagner’s Law for Mexico, Public Finance, 50(2), 
267-277. 
Maddala, G. S. (1992). Introduction to econometrics (2
nd ed.). Macmillan Publishing Co: 
New York. 
Maddala, G. S. and Kim, In-Moo. (1998). Unit roots, cointegration and structural 
change. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Mishkin, F. S. (1998). The economics of money, banking and financial markets (5
th ed.). 
Addison Wesley Longman: Reading, MA. 
Montes, M. F. (1998). The currency crisis in Southeast Asia (Updated ed.). Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore. 
Moosa, I. A. (2000). Exchange rate forecasting: Techniques and applications. Macmillan 
Press: London. 
Nasution, A. (1999). The financial crisis in Indonesia, in Seiichi Masuyama, Donna 
Vandenbrink and Chia Siow Yue (Eds.). East Asia’s Financial Systems: Evolution 
and Crisis. Nomura Research Institute and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: 
Tokyo. 
Pangestu, M. and Habir, M. (2002a). The boom, bust and restructuring of Indonesian 
banks (IMF Working Paper No. 02/66). International Monetary Fund: 
Washington DC. 
Pangestu, M. and Habir, M. (2002b). Restructuring of Indonesian banks post 1997-1998 
crisis, www.adbi.org/publications/dp/PangestuandHabir3b.pdf. 
Patterson, K. (2000). An introduction to applied econometrics: A time series approach. 
Macmillan Press: London. 
Pesaran, H. M. and Shin, Y. (1995). An autoregressive distributed lag modelling 
approach to cointegration analysis (DAE Working Paper Series, No. 9514). 
University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics: Cambridge. 
Pesaran, H. M., Shin, Y. and Smith, R. (1996). Testing the existence of a long-run 
relationship (DAE Working Paper Series, No. 9622) University of Cambridge, 
Department of Applied Economics: Cambridge. 
Pesaran, H. M. and Pesaran, B. (1997). Microfit 4.0. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
20 Radelet, S. and Sachs, J. D. (1998). The onset of the East Asian financial crisis (NBER 
Working Paper No. 6680) National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA. 
Sachs, J. D., Tornell, A. and Velasco, A. (1996). The Mexican peso crisis: Sudden death 
or death foretold? Journal of International Economics, 41, 265-283. 
Schwert, G. W. (1989) Tests for unit roots: A Monte Carlo investigation, Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics, 7, 147-159. 
Wickens, M. R. and Breusch, T. S. (1988). Dynamic specification, the long-run and the 
estimation of transformed regression models, Economic Journal, 98, 189-205. 
World Bank Policy Research Report. (2001). Finance for growth, policy choices in a 
volatile world. Oxford University Press: New York. 
 
 
21 22 LIST OF RECENT DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
02.01  S. Chatterjee and N. Podder, Equity, efficiency and social welfare: An 
application of generalized Lorenz dominance to New Zealand incomes data 
1984-98, January 2002. 
 
02.02  S. Richardson, Revisiting the income and growth effects of professional sport 
franchises:  Does success matter?, January 2002. 
 
02.03  N. Campbell and J. Jude Kline, Do profit maximizers take cold showers?, 
January 2002. 
 
02.04  L. M. Smith, A teacher reflects on the introductory economics course and 
Samuelson’s Economics, March 2002. 
 
02.05  S. Richardson, Efficiency estimation using the stochastic production frontier 
approach:  Evidence from the National Rugby League, March 2002. 
 
02.06  S. Chatterjee and N. Podder, Economic inequality in colour: Some ethnic 
dimensions of income distribution in New Zealand 1984-98, March 2002. 
 
02.07  J. Obben, Towards a formal profiling model to foster active labour market 
policies in New Zealand, April 2002. 
 
02.08  M. E. Ali, Transfer of sustainable energy technology to developing countries as 
a means of reducing greenhouse gas emission - The case of Bangladesh: Review 
of relevant literature, August 2002. 
 
02.09  M. E. Ali, Transfer of sustainable energy technology for rural Bangladesh: 
Opportunity for New Zealand, August 2002. 
 
02.10  M. E. Ali, Energy consumption pattern in rural Bangladesh - The opportunity 
for New Zealand:  A household survey, October 2002. 
 
02.11  S. Shakur, A. N. Rae and S. Chatterjee, How comprehensive will be the doha 
round? Experiments with agricultural and non-agricultural reforms, October 
2002. 
 
02.12  J. J. Su, On the size of a serial correlation robust panel unit root test in 
cointegrated panels, November 2002. 
 
03.01  J. E. Alvey, Adam Smith’s optimistic teleological view of history, February 2003. 
 
03.02   J. E. Alvey, Adam Smith’s view of history:  Consistent or paradoxical?, 
March 2003. 
23  




03.04 J.  J.  Su,  A note on spurious regression in panels with cross-section dependence, 
June 2003. 
 
03.05 J.  E.  Alvey,  Adam Smith’s pessimistic view of the future of commercial society: 
rhetoric or reality? September 2003. 
 
03.06 J.  E.  Alvey,  Adam Smith’s globalization (but anti-secularization) theory, 
September 2003. 
 
03.07  J. Obben and A. E. Nugroho, Determinants of the funding volatility of Indonesian 
banks: A dynamic model, December 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 